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APPRAISAL OF THE SUCCESS OF THE INSTRUMENTS OF
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION VIS-A-VIS
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL LITIGATION AND
MEDIATION IN THE HARMONIZATION OF THE RULES OF
TRANSNATIONAL COMMERCIAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION
Samuel Maireg Biresaw*
ABSTRACT
This article compares the major instruments of International Commercial Arbitration
(hereinafter ‘ICA’) with the instruments of International Commercial Litigation and
Mediation. By so doing, the article comparatively assesses the success of ICA, litigation, and
mediation as alternative mechanisms of transnational commercial dispute resolution.
Accordingly, the article argues that, while the ICA is not the only means of transnational
commercial dispute resolution, it will continue to be the most successful means of dispute
resolution, playing the dominant role in harmonizing the rules of transnational commercial
dispute resolution. However, the article also argues that, over time, transnational commercial
litigation and mediation are becoming more viable alternatives to ICA in resolving
transnational commercial disputes.
KEY WORDS
International Commercial Arbitration, Transnational Litigation, Mediation, Dispute
resolution, Harmonization
INTRODUCTION
In the second half of the twentieth century, there was a massive expansion of
international trade, which led to the development of the global economy. Such growth
allowed the cross-border movement of people, products, services, and capital, resulting in an
avalanche of international commercial contracts and a commensurate surge in transnational
disputes, among other things.1
However, mainly due to the lack of internationally applicable rules on the applicable
law, jurisdiction, and recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments2, transnational
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and the entire Editorial Team of the Journal of Dispute Resolution (JDR).
1
See Gary B. Born, Planning for International Dispute Resolution, 17 J. INT’L ARB. 61, 72
(2011), https://ssrn.com/abstract=1959851; see also Fabien Gelinas, Arbitration and the Challenge of
Globalization, 17 J. INT’L ARB. 117, 122 (2000), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1342341.
2
See Javier H. Rubinstein, International Commercial Arbitration: Reflections at the Crossroads of the
Common Law and Civil Law Traditions, 5 CHI. J. INT’L L. 303, 310 (2004),
https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cjil/vol5/iss1/20; See Andrew Sagartz, Resolution of International
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commercial disputes become uncertain, expensive, and time-consuming to resolve uniformly
and efficiently.3
Moreover, a large number of parties and proceedings, procedural complexity, a high
chance of forum shopping, difficulty in enforcing foreign judgments, and higher costs have
worsened the situation.4
The need for cheaper, faster, more flexible, and less risky international solutions that
give disputants ex-ante assurance and predictability in the resolution of their commercial
disputes arose as a result of the aforementioned problems.5
To address the aforementioned issues, international law-making bodies have been
working for many years to harmonize the applicable substantive and conflicts of law rules to
regulate and establish effective transnational commercial dispute resolution mechanisms such
as ICA, transnational litigation, and mediation.6 In that intention, this article comparatively
analyzes the roles of these instruments that are destined to regulate transnational commercial
disputes and argues that ICA was and continues to be the most practical mechanism of
transnational commercial dispute resolution, while transnational litigation and mediation will
continue to play a role in dispute resolution as an alternative.
Accordingly, this article contains four parts. Part one discusses the definition and
role of ICA in the harmonization of the rules of transnational commercial dispute resolution.
Then part two analyzes the role of the instruments of transnational commercial litigation in
the harmonization of the rules of commercial dispute resolution. Then, part three assesses the
role of the instruments of international commercial mediation in the harmonization of the
rules of transnational commercial dispute resolution. Then, the final part contains the
conclusion.

Commercial Disputes: Surmounting Barriers of Culture without Going to Court, 13 OHIO ST. J. DISP. RESOL.
675, 709 (1998), http://hdl.handle.net/1811/79806; see also Eric D. Green, International Commercial Dispute
Resolution: Courts, Arbitration, and Mediation- Introduction, 15 BOSTON U. INT’L L.J. 175, 178 (1997).
3
ROY GOODE ET AL., TRANSNATIONAL COMMERCIAL LAW: TEXT, CASES, AND MATERIALS 49, 73 (Oxford
Univ. Press 2nd ed. 2015).
4
Steven C. Nelson, Alternatives to Litigation of International Disputes, 23 INT’L L. 187, 188; see CHRISTIAN
BIHRING-UHILE ET AL., ARBITRATION AND MEDIATION IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 31–68 (Kluwer L. Int’l
ed., 2nd ed. 2006); see also CHRISTOPHER R. DRAHOZAL & RICHARD W. NAIMARK, TOWARDS A SCIENCE OF
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: COLLECTED EMPIRICAL RESEARCH 59 (Kluwer L. Int’l ed., 2005).
5
See Ramona Martinez, Recognition and Enforcement of International Arbitral Awards under the United
Nations Convention of 1958: The “Refusal” Provisions Introduction - Why is Choosing Your Dispute
Resolution Method Important?, 24 INT’L L. 487, 518 (1990), https://www.jstor.org/stable/40706404; See
Giuseppe De Palo & Linda Costabile, Promotion of International Commercial Arbitration and other
alternative Dispute Resolution Techniques in Ten Southern Mediterranean, 7 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL.
303, 314 (2007); Richard Garnett, The Hague Choice of Court Convention: Magnum Opus or Much Ado About
Nothing?, 5 PRIVATE INT’L L. J. 161, 180 (2009), https://ssrn.com/abstract=1691867.
6
See REYADH MOHAMED SEYADI, THE EFFECT OF THE 1958 NEW YORK CONVENTION ON FOREIGN ARBITRAL
AWARDS IN THE ARAB GULF STATES (Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2017); see James Tancula & Miles
Robinson, Arbitration vs. Litigation: Choosing Your Dispute Resolution Method Wisely (Nov. 15, 2017),
https://www.mayerbrown.com//media/files/perspectivesevents/events/2017/11/arbitrationvslitigationchoosingy
ourdisputere/files/viewslides/fileattachment/mayerbrownwebinararbitrationvslitigationchoosingyo.pdf; see also
Bobette Wolski, Recent Developments in International Commercial Dispute Resolution: Expanding the
Options, 13 BOND L. R. 1, 30 (2001).
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1. THE ROLE OF ICA IN THE HARMONIZATION OF THE RULES OF
TRANSNATIONAL COMMERCIAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION
1.1 Definition of International Commercial Arbitration
Almost all the applicable international commercial laws discussed in this article do
not directly define ICA.7 This does not however imply that it is impossible to construct a
consensual definition of the term. Accordingly, the term ICA is made up of three basic
notions. These are international, commercial, and arbitration.8
First, the term “international” marks arbitrations that are purely national from those
that transcend national boundaries.9 Second, the term “international” generally refers to the
fact that the nature of the dispute or the nationality of the parties or the chosen place of
arbitration is essentially anational or characterized by a foreign element.10
On its part, the term “commercial” although it may cover a wide set of meanings,
when it comes to arbitration, only applies to commercial contracts.11 Accordingly, to indicate
what types of activities are deemed “commercial” in nature, the UNCITRAL Model Law
2006 enumerates a non-exhaustive list of commercial relationships.12
On the other hand, the term “arbitration” does not have a universally accepted
definition. However, it can be defined as a method of resolving disputes definitively and
according to the parties’ agreement that allows disputants to obtain a final and binding
decision from independent or private third-party arbitrators, without recourse to a court of
law.13
7

This includes the MODEL LAW ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION (UNITED NATIONS COMM’N
INT’L TRADE L. 1985), https://uncitral.un.org/sites/uncitral.un.org/files/media-documents/uncitral/en/1909955_e_ebook.pdf, [hereinafter UNICTRAL MODEL LAW], United Nations Convention on the Recognition
and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 3,
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/showDetails.aspx?objid=080000028002a36b, [hereinafter N.Y. Convention], the
Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreement of 2005, Jun. 30, 2005, 44 I.L.M. 1294,
https://assets.hcch.net/docs/510bc238-7318-47ed-9ed5-e0972510d98b.pdf, [hereinafter the COCA 2005], the
Hague Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil Commercial Matters,
July 2, 2019, https://assets.hcch.net/docs/806e290e-bbd8-413d-b15e-8e3e1bf1496d.pdf, [hereinafter the
Judgment Convention of 2019], and United Nations Convention on International Settlement Agreements
Resulting from Mediation, Aug. 7, 2019, https://uncitral.un.org/sites/uncitral.un.org/files/mediadocuments/EN/Texts/UNCITRAL/Arbitration/mediation_convention_v1900316_eng.pdf,[hereinafter
Singapore Convention 2018].
8
The requirements of International and Commercial are adopted by all the relevant Conventions, the COCA
2005, the New York Convention 1958, the Singapore Convention 2018, and the Judgment Convention of 2019.
9
ALAN REDFERN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 9, 12 (Oxford Univ. Press ed., 6th ed. 2015).
10
UNICTRAL MODEL LAW, supra note 7, at art. 1(3); see N.Y. Convention, supra note 7, at art. 1(1); see
ARB. RULES art. 1(1), 1(3)(a)–(b)(i)–(ii) & (c) (INT’L CHAMBER OF COM. 1998), https://www.translex.org/750200/_/icc-arbitration-rules-1998/ [hereinafter ICC RULES]; see COCA 2005, supra note 7, art. 1(2)–
(3).
11
N.Y. Convention, supra note 7, at art. 1(3); see Protocol on Arbitration Clauses, Sept. 24, 1923, League of
Nations, Treaty Series, vol. XXVII, p. 157, art. 1, https://www.trans-lex.org/511300/_/protocol-on-arbitrationclauses-signed-at-a-meeting-of-the-assembly-of-the-league-of-nations-held-on-the-twenty-fourth-day-ofseptember-nineteen-hundred-and-twenty-three/ [hereinafter Geneva Protocol].
12
GOODE ET AL., supra note 3, at 563; see UNCITRAL Model Law, supra note 7, at art. 1(1).
13
GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: COMMENTARY AND MATERIALS 1 (Kluwer
L. Int’l ed., 2nd ed. 2001); see EWAN MCKENDRICK, GOODE ON COMMERCIAL LAW 1299 (LexisNexis 4th ed.
ON
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Accordingly, by way of deduction, ICA can be defined as a transnational, private,
and autonomous method of resolving disputes, via the decision of one or more arbitrators that
leads to a final and binding determination of the rights and obligations of the parties, who are
engaged in a cross-border commercial relationship.14
The following section argues that ICA was and continues to be the most realistic
means of resolving transnational commercial disputes for the following four main reasons: (1)
the advantageous features of ICA, (2) ICA is supported by a strong international legal
framework, (3) ICA is supported by a strong institutional framework, and (4) the dominant
role of ICA is evident from existing empirical research.
1.2 The Major Advantageous Features of ICA made it suitable for Dispute Resolution
The following are the major features of ICA that made it more suitable and
preferable to resolve transnational commercial disputes in comparison to transnational
litigation and mediation:
1. Unlike litigation, ICA provides the parties with autonomy over the process and
the legal framework of dispute resolution.15 As a result, disputants can predetermine the
applicable substantive laws, the seat of the arbitration, and nominate the arbitrators.16
2. Unlike litigation, arbitral proceedings are essentially private and confidential that
do not allow third parties to have access to them.17 To that effect, the parties can ascertain
2009); REDFERN ET AL., supra note 9, at 2; see KEREN TWEEDDALE & ANDREW TWEEDDALE, ARBITRATION OF
COMMERCIAL DISPUTES: INTERNATIONAL AND ENGLISH LAW AND PRACTICE 33 (Oxford Univ. Press ed.,
2007). However, arbitration may recourse to the court in exceptional cases related to the enforcement of
arbitral awards.
14
Roy Goode, The Role of the Lex Loci Arbitri in International Commercial Arbitration, 17 ARB. INT’L 19, 39
(2001); see Winston Stromberg, Avoiding the Full Court Press: International Commercial Arbitration and
Other Global Alternative Dispute Resolution Processes, 40 LOYOLA L.A. L. REV. 1337, 1341 (2007); see
ZHENG SOPHIA TANG, JURISDICTION AND ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL LAW
2, 67 (Routledge Publishers ed., 2014).
15
GOODE ET AL., supra note 3, at 555, 560, 1302; Dalma R. Demeter & Kayleigh M. Smith, The Implications
of International Commercial Courts on Arbitration, 33 J. INT’L ARB. 441, 470 (2016). Accordingly, the
freedom to choose arbitrators ensures an increased trust and enables the parties to select skillful arbitrators for
each case. The parties are also at freedom to submit the arbitration to either ad-hoc or institutional arbitration.
16
N.Y. Convention, supra note 7, at art. 2 & 5(1)(a); see GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION 83–85 (Wolters Kluwer ed., 2nd ed. 2014); see Susan Choi, Judicial Enforcement of Arbitration
Awards Under the ICSID and New York Conventions, 28 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 175 (1996); see Richard A.
Cole, The Public Policy Exception to the New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Arbitral
Awards, 1 OHIO ST. J. DISP. RESOL. 365, 368 (1985). Institutional arbitration, by providing the rules,
infrastructure, and panel of arbitrators, results in the certainty of the procedure and trustworthiness of the
arbitrators. The overall outcome will be trust, security, and predictability of the process to the parties, which
are typical traits of an attractive procedure of dispute settlement.
17
ARBITRATION
RULES
arts.
19(4),
30
(LONDON
C T.
OF
INT’L
ARB.
1998),
https://lcia.org/Dispute_Resolution_Services/LCIA_Arbitration_Rules.aspx [hereinafter LCIA RULES]; see
ARBITRATION RULES art. 52–53, 73–76 (THE WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG. 1994),
https://www.jus.uio.no/lm/wipo.arbitration.rules.1994/toc.html [hereinafter WIPO RULES]; see ICC RULES,
supra note 10, at art. 21(3), 26(3); see ARBITRATION RULES art. 25(4), 28(3) & 32(5), (UNITED NATIONS
COMM’N
ON
INT’L
TRADE
L.
1976),
https://uncitral.un.org/sites/uncitral.un.org/files/mediadocuments/uncitral/en/arb-rules.pdf [hereinafter UNCITRAL RULES];; see INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION
RULES art. 20(4) (AM. ARB. ASSO’N 2021), https://www.adr.org/sites/default/files/ICDR%20Rules_0.pdf
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confidentiality in the arbitral process by signing a confidentiality agreement as part of their
dispute resolution clause.18
3. Unlike litigation, ICA is a one-step process that does not allow for appellate
review, which results in a binding and final award with very limited grounds for judicial
review.19 Unlike mediation in which one of the parties may refuse to uphold the terms of the
agreement there by forcing the other party to file a separate proceeding, arbitral awards are
generally final, binding, and not appealable on the merits.20
4. Unlike the case of foreign judgments and mediated settlement agreements, due to
the New York Convention of 1958, the global recognition and enforcement of the agreement
to arbitrate and arbitral awards is the most important feature of ICA, which made it realistic.21
This is very significant to the parties because it guarantees ex-ante predictability and certainty
in the resolution of their commercial dispute. 22
5. Unlike litigation, ICA is an autonomous and anational institution that is not
subjected to the framework of national legal systems.23 Agreeing to arbitration allows a party
[hereinafter AAA INT’L ARB. RULES]; see MARGARET L. MOSES, THE PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE OF
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 1, 10 (Cambridge Univ. Press ed., 2nd ed. 2012). There is a high
degree of confidentiality in the underway of the tribunal, which requires keeping the contents of the proceeding
and the award confidential. Moreover, public trials can harm arbitral proceedings. Additionally, ICA offers
various degrees of confidentiality to the parties and enables them to preserve long-term relationships.
18
DIFC
ARBITRATION
LAW
N O.
1
art.
14
(2008),
https://www.difc.ae/application/files/9816/4663/4031/Arbitration_Law_DIFC_Law_No_1_of_2008.pdf;
see
JOSEPH F. MORRISSEY & JACK M. GRAVES, ARBITRATION AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO NATIONAL COURTS IN
INTERNATIONAL SALES LAW AND ARBITRATION: PROBLEMS, CASES AND COMMENTARY 313, 314 (Kluwer L.
Int’l ed., 2008); see Roy Shapira, A Reputational Theory of Corporate Law, 26:1 STANFORD L. & POL. REV. 1,
60 (2015); see ELZA REYMOND-ENIAEVA, TOWARDS A UNIFORM APPROACH TO CONFIDENTIALITY OF
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 1, 30 (Springer Publishers ed., 2019). Unless otherwise agreed,
there is a duty of confidentiality in arbitration proceedings conducted in England, Hong Kong, Dubai, or
Singapore.
19
Born, supra note 1, at 65; see UNCITRAL RULES, supra note 17, at art. 34(2); see Steven C. Nelson,
Alternatives to Litigation of International Disputes, 23 INT’L L. 187, 206 (1989); Emil Petrossian,
Developments, In Pursuit of the Perfect Forum: Forum Shopping in the United States and England, 40
LOYOLA L.A. L. REV. 1257, 1260–63 (2007). By so doing, arbitration minimizes the risk of multiple
proceedings for the parties.
20
GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 13 (Aspen
Publishers ed., 2nd ed. 2011); see DAVID HOLLOWAY ET AL., SCHMITTHOFF: THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF
INTERNATIONAL TRADE 587 (Sweet & Maxwell eds., 12th ed. 2012). Nether the UNCITRAL Model Law nor
the New York Convention allows for exceptional grounds of appeal. See Mateus Aimore Carreteiro, Appellate
Arbitral Rules in International Commercial Arbitration 33 J. INT’L ARB. 185, 188 (2016). It is not generally a
custom of arbitral institutions to include an appellate mechanism for arbitration. Therefore, finality results in a
speedier, more efficient, and cheaper resolution of the dispute to the parties.
21
N.Y. Convention, supra note 3, at art. 3; ICC RULES, supra note 10, at art. 28(6); S. I. Strong, Beyond
International Commercial Arbitration? The Promise of International Commercial Mediation, 45 WASH. U. L.
& POL’Y 11, 33, 40 (2014) (unlike a mediated settlement agreement, an agreement to arbitrate is not only an
agreement to take part in arbitral proceedings but also an agreement to carry out the resulting arbitral award).
22
MOSES, supra note 17, at 2–3. (stating arbitral awards have a similar legal effect as a court judgment and
they will be directly enforceable by court action throughout the 163 member states of the New York
Convention.).
23
See Richard J. Graving, The International Commercial Arbitration Institutions: How Good A Job Are They
Doing?
4
A M.
UNIV.
INT’L
L.
REV.
319,
323–24
(2011),
https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1676&context=auilr (describing how
subjugating transnational disputes to national courts often gives rise to the risk of local bias, corruption,
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to avoid litigation in an unknown foreign court jurisdiction and enables to pursue resolutions
in delocalized, private proceedings.24
6. Because, unlike litigation, in the case of arbitration the dispute is resolved in a
neutral place of arbitration rather than on the home turf of one of the parties, ICA reduces
partiality and inequality between disputants.25
7. Unlike litigation, ICA provides the parties with the opportunity to tailor the
dispute resolution mechanism to their favor by agreement. Therefore, arbitral proceedings are
flexible and less formal than litigation, which gives the parties greater control over the
procedures.26
8. Unlike litigation, ICA is the product of the voluntary agreement between the
parties to submit their dispute to arbitration. Before there can be a valid arbitration, there must
first be a written and valid agreement to arbitrate.27 On the contrary, the jurisdiction of
national courts and the appointment of local judges are not dependent upon the will of
litigants.28

national public policy exceptions, delay, lack of cross border expertise by local judges, lack of knowledge and
respect to foreign laws, and the risk of litigation in an unfamiliar language and so on).
24
Petra Butler & Christoph Katerndahl, Kastom – A Public Policy Exception under the New York Convention
on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 7 INDIAN J. ARB. L. 104, 119 (2018),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3270313 (stating the atmosphere of arbitration is generally considered less hostile
than that of litigation with the ICA empowering parties to escape the jurisdiction of hostile national courts by
signing the agreement to arbitrate).
25
Christian Bühring-Uhle, A Survey on Arbitration and Settlement in International Business Disputes, in
TOWARDS A SCIENCE OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 25, 31 (Christopher R. Drahozal & Richard W.
Naimark eds., 2005); Gilles Cuniberti, Beyond Contract – The Case for Default Arbitration in International
Commercial Disputes, 32 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 417, 423 (2008); Andrew Barraclough & Jeff Waincymer,
Mandatory Rules of Law in International Commercial Arbitration, 6 MELBOURNE J. INT’L L. 205, 244 (2005),
https://law.unimelb.edu.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0003/1681167/Barraclough-and-Waincymer.pdf
(guaranteeing procedural equality and fairness of arbitrators in a neutral tribunal located in a third country, ICA
reduces partiality and inequality between disputants as neutrality is also related to the appointment of neutral
and impartial arbitrators by disputants that will preside on the case solely based on merit and expertise).
26
Alessandra Casella, On Market Integration and the Development of Institutions: The Case of International
Commercial Arbitration, 40 EUR. ECON. REV. 155, 159 (1995); Eloise Henderson Bouzari, Note: The Public
Policy Exception to Enforcement of International Arbitral Awards: Implications for Post-NAFTA
Jurisprudence, 30 TEX. INT’L L. J. 205, 209 (1995). Accordingly, the parties can flexibly determine the
number and qualifications of arbitrators, the location of the hearings, the language of the proceedings, or the
rules of evidence and in the absence of party agreement, the arbitral tribunal has the discretion to determine
procedural matters which avoids cumbersome procedures and facilitates a speedier and cheaper resolution to
the parties.
27
N.Y. Convention, supra note 7, at art. 2(3), 5(1)(a); UNCITRAL MODEL LAW, supra note 7, at art. 7(1), 35,
36(1); COCA 2005, supra note 7, at art. 9(a), Jun. 30, 2005, 44 I.L.M. 1294; TANG, supra note 14, at 2 & 67;
James M. Hosking, The Third Party Non-Signatory’s Ability to Compel International Commercial Arbitration:
Doing Justice without Destroying Consent, 4 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L. J. 469, 493 (2004).
28
MCKENDRICK, supra note 13, at 1300–02. Arbitration usually presupposes the existence of a dispute that is
capable of settlement by arbitration, which the parties voluntarily submit for arbitration. Therefore, the
voluntary nature of ICA is fundamental to the parties who are presumed to go to arbitration consensually after a
cost-benefit assessment.
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1.3 ICA is supported by Strong International Legal and Institutional Framework
The following section argues that ICA become a realistic method of commercial
dispute resolution due to the strong legal framework provided by international commercial
instruments and the existence of an international institutional framework destined to
administer the arbitration.29
1.3.1 The Contribution of Strong International Legal Frameworks
1.3.1.1 The Existing International Legal Instruments of ICA
The first modern and genuinely international instrument was the 1923 Geneva
Protocol. It had 40 member states. Like the case of the modern-day equivalent Conventions,
the Protocol, at that time, had two objectives. Firstly, to ensure that arbitration clauses were
enforceable internationally, and secondly, to ensure that arbitration awards would be enforced
in the territory of the states in which they were made.30 The 1923 Protocol was followed by
the 1927 Geneva Convention, which was intended to widen the scope of the Geneva Protocol
by providing additional recognition and enforcement to awards made also within the territory
of any of the Contracting States.31
The other influential instrument was the Panama Convention, which has been
adopted by 17 South American countries, including the USA, and Mexico. The Panama
Convention, which is similar to the New York Convention in terms of object and nature,
made arbitration much more acceptable in Latin American countries.32
The other significant instrument was the European Convention on International
Commercial Arbitration 1961. It complemented the New York Convention in the Contracting
States. It provides for several general issues concerning the party’s rights in arbitration and
specific limited reasons for refusing to recognize or enforce an award in another Contracting
State.33

29

See generally Graving, supra note 23, 319–76.
Julie Barker, International Mediation–A Better Alternative for the Resolution of Commercial Disputes:
Guidelines for a U.S. Negotiator Involved in an International Commercial Mediation with Mexicans, 19
LOYOLA
L.A.
INT’L
COMPAR.
L.
REV.
1,
5–7
(1996),
https://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1404&context=ilr.
31
Convention on the Execution of Foreign Arbitral Awards art. 1, Sep. 26, 1927, 92 L.N.T.S. 2096 [hereinafter
1927 Geneva Convention].
32
Inter-American Convention on International Commercial Arbitration art. 1–13, Jan. 30, 1975, 90 T.I.A.S.
No. 1027, O.A.S.T.S. No. 42, https://treaties.un.org/Pages/showDetails.aspx?objid=08000002800d06cc
[hereinafter Inter-American Convention] (showing similarities to the New York Convention in terms of object
and nature, making arbitration much more acceptable in Latin American countries with the Inter-American
Convention on International Commercial Arbitration’s adoption by the Governments of the Member States of
the Organization of American States (OAS) in Panama and coming in to force in 1976 as per art. 10); see also
infra § 1.3.1.3 (discussing the New York Convention).
33
Cf. European Convention on International Commercial Arbitration art. 1–16, Jan. 7, 1964, 484 U.N.T.S. 349,
https://www.jus.uio.no/english/services/library/treaties/11/11-05/european-commercial-arbitration.xml.
30
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1.3.1.2 The Role of UNCITRAL in the Development of ICA
The harmonization and development of ICA law have been the major objective of
the UNCITRAL since its inception in 1966.34 The increase in the use of arbitration as a means
of transnational dispute resolution is also greatly attributed to the considerable work of the
UNCITRAL.35 In this regard, the UNCITRAL made two fruitful contributions. Accordingly,
The UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules of 1976 is the first major achievement of the UNCITRAL
in the field of dispute settlement.36 These rules were modern and played a great role to
reconcile the procedural differences between the civil and the common law systems. The rules
were successful in being referenced in innumerable arbitration agreements and were adopted
by a substantial number of arbitral institutions.37 A new version of the rules was adopted in
2010.38 The new rules apply to any new arbitration agreements, concluded after August 15,
2010, that adopt the UNCITRAL rules.39
The second major contribution of the UNCITRAL was the enactment of the more
comprehensive UNCITRAL Model Law of 1985, which is destined to govern ICA.40 By
2021, it is evident that the Model Law has been a major success that has been adopted in 118
jurisdictions in 85 states.41 The Model Law introduced the idea that it would be appropriate to
have separate rules for domestic and international arbitrations. The Model Law was also
successful in influencing domestic arbitration rules by providing essential default provisions
to gradually improve and consolidate national arbitration laws to take into account the
particular features and needs of international commercial arbitration.42 Despite its success,
however, the Model Law was revised in 2006, among other things, to modernize the form
required of an arbitration agreement to better conform to international contract practices and
to establish a more comprehensive legal regime dealing with interim measures in support of
arbitration.43
34

Gerold Herrmann, UNCITRAL’s Work Towards a Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, 4
PACE L. REV. 537, 537, 580 (1984).
35
R. Mohamed S., supra note 6, 1-12.
36
See generally Int’l Trade L. Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its Ninth Session, U.N. Doc. A/31/17 (1976).
37
See, e.g., PROCEDURES FOR CASES UNDER THE UNICITRAL ARBITRATION RULES 4 (AM. ARB. ASS’N,
2005),https://www.adr.org/sites/default/files/Procedures%20for%20Cases%20under%20the%20UNCITRAL%
20Arbitration%20RULES.pdf.
38
G.A. Res. 65/22, UNICITRAL Arbitration Rules (2010).
39
THE UNCITRAL ARBITRATION RULES: A COMMENTARY 16–17 (David Caron & Lee Caplan eds., 2nd ed.
2013).
40
The UNCITRAL Model Law is comprehensive in the sense that it covers all stages of the arbitral process,
from the agreement to arbitrate to recognition and enforcement, and the judicial review of arbitral awards.. See
generally UNCITRAL MODEL LAW, supra note 7.
41
See UNCITRAL, Status: UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration (1985), with
amendments
as
adopted
in
2006,
UNITED
NATIONS,
https://uncitral.un.org/en/texts/arbitration/modellaw/commercial_arbitration/status (last visited Sept. 10, 2021)
[hereinafter UNICTRAL Status].
42
UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration (1985), with amendments as adopted in
2006, UNITED NATIONS, https://uncitral.un.org/en/texts/arbitration/modellaw/commercial_arbitration (“The
Model Law is designed to assist States in reforming and modernizing their laws on arbitral procedure…”).
43
In July 2006, the UNCITRAL adopted amendments to articles 1 (2), 7, and 35 (2) and a new article 2 (a) and
a chapter 4 (a) were added to replace article 17. The Revised Model Law was approved by the United Nations
in December 2006. See UNCITRAL MODEL LAW, supra note 7, at p. 1.
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1.3.1.3 The Role of the Instruments of ICA in the Harmonization of the Rules of
Transnational Commercial Dispute Resolution
i. The Success of the New York Convention in Dispute Resolution
The bedrock treaty for the preferred use of ICA as a means of transnational
commercial dispute resolution is the New York Convention of 1958 (hereafter ‘the
Convention’).44 The main purpose of the Convention was to facilitate the international
recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards and thereby result in a speedier and cheaper
settlement of disputes.45 It is evident that the Convention has been astonishingly successful in
achieving these objectives.46 Accordingly, by 2021, the Convention had been ratified by 169
countries, including almost all of the major trading nations of the world, and with wider
geographic diversity in ratification.47
Over the past 60 years, the Convention has had a great deal of success in achieving
its commercial objectives of providing disputants with ex-ante certainty and predictability in
dispute resolution by ensuring prompt enforcement of the agreement to arbitrate and arbitral
awards, as well as party autonomy in determining the governing law and jurisdiction. This has
resulted in a dramatic increase in the use of arbitration to resolve international commercial
disputes.48 Accordingly, to date, there are 1750 court decisions in more than 65 countries that
have uniformly interpreted and applied the provisions of the Convention to issues in a
dispute.49
Moreover, the Convention, by equipping national courts and tribunals with a durable
(dependable) and efficient means of enforcement of arbitration agreements and awards,
regardless of the place of the forum, has facilitated the remarkable growth and success of
ICA.50 All of the benefits of ICA that are enjoyed by disputants in the course of their dispute
resolution are made possible by the Convention’s instrumentality, which contained the
necessary tools in its provisions to achieve its intended objectives, resulting in a high rate of
global enforcement.51
It should be noted that arbitration would have been invaluable absent this
international agreement to recognize and enforce arbitral awards where the award debtor has

44

N.Y. Convention, supra note 7, at art. 38.
Id. at p. 4 art. 1 (“. . . on the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards, and to consider other
possible measures for increasing the effectiveness of arbitration in the settlement of private law disputes.”
46
GOODE, supra note 14, at 22.
47
UNCITRAL Status, supra note 41; Erman Radjagukguk, Implementation of the 1958 New York Convention
in Several Asian Countries: The Refusal of Foreign Arbitral Awards Enforcement of the Grounds of Public
Policy, 1(1) INDONESIA L. REV. 1, 1 (2011).
48
DRAHOZAL & NAIMARK, supra note 4, at 341.
49
See generally Topic List of Court Decisions on the New York Convention Cases, N.Y. ARB. CONVENTION,
http://www.newyorkconvention.org/court+decisions/decisions+per+topic (last visited Sept. 10, 2021);
STEPHAN W. SCHILL, YEARBOOK COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION VOL. XLVI ( ICCA & Kluwer L. Int’l eds., 2021).
50
Gary B. Born, The New York Convention: A Self-Executing Treaty, 40 MICH. J. INT’L L. 115, 115 (2018);
REDFERN ET AL., supra note 8, at 69.
51
Marike R.P. Paulsson, The 1958 New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Arbitral Awards from an Unusual Perspective: Moving Forward by Parting With It, 5(2) INDIAN J. ARB. L. 23,
42 (2017).

45
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sufficient assets.52 By laying down the foundation for most national legislations governing the
international arbitral process53 and establishing uniform international standards for the
recognition of arbitration agreements and arbitral awards, the Convention unified
(harmonized) the legal regime and methods of deciding whether to recognize and enforce a
foreign arbitral award.54
ii. The Role of the New York Convention as an Instrument of ICA
The Convention imposes on its parties the obligations to recognize and enforce: (a)
the agreement to arbitrate unless it is found to be void55 and (b) foreign awards under the
agreement by efficient proceedings.56 These provisions of enforcement are self-executing and
directly applicable. Moreover, the fact that the Convention governs the arbitration
agreements, the conduct of the arbitration itself, and the enforcement of the awards made it a
comprehensive instrument that dealt with all major elements of the arbitral process.57
Furthermore, the Convention permits foreign courts to refuse to enforce an
agreement to arbitrate only based on the ground of substantive invalidity under the ordinary
principles of contract law. Consequently, domestic courts are prohibited from invalidating
arbitration agreements based on any other domestic ground. Thus, by eliminating the
imposition of exceptional local grounds for the invalidity of the agreement to arbitrate, this
rule results in the harmonious recognition of arbitration agreements.58
Similar to the agreement to arbitrate, the Convention is industrious in establishing
uniform international rules of validity and enforceability of foreign (non-domestic) arbitral
awards.59 In that respect, the Convention contains provisions that exclusively apply to foreign
awards, which are destined to ensure the speedy and efficient recognition of arbitral awards,
giving effect to the parties’ underlying objectives in agreeing to resolve their disputes by
arbitration.60 On the other hand, the Convention also exhaustively enumerates seven
exceptional grounds whereby recognition and enforcement of an award may be refused by a

52

Brette L. Steele, Enforcing International Commercial Mediation Agreements as Arbitral Awards under the
New York Convention, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1385, 1412 (2007).
53
For example, article 2 (3) requires the courts of Contracting States, when seized of a matter subject to
arbitration, to refer the parties to arbitration (instead of litigation) while staying its proceeding, which is a
crucial step towards the delocalization of arbitral rules and ascertainment of party autonomy. N.Y. Convention,
supra note 7, at art. II.
54
BORN, supra note 16, at 92–93; Nivedita Chandrakanth Shenoy, ‘Public Policy under Article 5 (2) (b) of the
New York Convention: Is There a Transnational Standard’, 20 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 77, 103 (2018).
55
N.Y. Convention, supra note 7, at art. II. (imposing mandatory substantive validity rules, directed
specifically to national courts, for the recognition and enforcement of international arbitration agreements).
56
Id. art. II–VI; GOODE ET AL., supra note 3, at 563.
57
Christopher R. Drahozal, The New York Convention and the American Federal System, 2012(1) J. DISP.
RESOL. 101, 104 (2012).
58
N.Y. Convention, supra note 7, at art. II (1), III.
59
Simon Burger, 55 Years after Austria’s Accession to the New York Convention: Crucial Issues in Light of
the Supreme Court’s Case Law, in 5 YEARBOOK ON INT’L ARB. ADR 93 (Marianne Roth & Michael
Geistlinger eds., 2017).
60
N.Y. Convention, supra note 7, at art. III(1)–(2), VI(1)–(2).
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foreign court.61 Therefore, the exhaustive (limited) nature of the recognized exceptional
grounds to refuse enforcement under the Convention is a testament to its commitment to
enforce arbitral awards.62
The other significant achievement of the Convention is the international choice-oflaw rules that govern the selection of the law applicable to international arbitration
agreements. The rule requires the Contracting States to give effect to the parties’ choice of
law governing their agreement to arbitrate and in the absence of any express or implied choice
by the parties, to apply the law of the arbitral seat.63 This rule ascertained party autonomy in
determining the applicable law and provided essential clarity concerning the law applicable to
the parties’ arbitration agreement by guarantying the recognition of all material terms of
international arbitration agreements including the parties’ choice of the arbitral seat, the
selection of institutional rules, the choice of arbitrators, and arbitral procedures.64
The other attractive feature of the Convention is its potential to be applied in
harmony with other favorable multilateral or bilateral agreements related to the recognition
and enforcement of arbitral awards to which the Contracting States are parties. Accordingly,
the provisions of the Convention do not affect the validity of multilateral or bilateral
agreements concerning the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards entered into by the
Contracting States nor deprive any interested party of any right he may have to avail himself
of an arbitral award in the manner and to the extent allowed by the law or the treaties of the
country where such award is sought to be relied upon.65
Additionally, the Convention, by allowing States to make two specific reservations
in due course of ratification, is proved flexible. One of them limits the Convention’s
application to awards in disputes having a commercial character and the other reservation
pertains to reciprocity.66 This empowers the Contracting States to take advantage of the
reservations considering their local scenarios and still enables them to ratify the Convention.67
To conclude, the great deal of attention given by the Convention to the recognition
and enforcement of the arbitration agreement and foreign awards, the expedited and
simplified recognition procedures, party autonomy regarding arbitral procedures, the limited
grounds of refusal, and the prescribed choice-of-law rules were central in establishing an
efficient legal framework of ICA. The Convention has been central to these developments by
providing the foundation for contemporary ICA and being one of the pillars of today’s
broader international legal system of commercial dispute resolution.68 All the above qualities
61

Id. at art. VI(1)(a)–(e), (2)(a)–( b); Jonathan Hill, The Exercise of Judicial Discretion in Relation to
Applications to Enforce Arbitral Awards under the New York Convention 1958, 36 (2) OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD.
304, 305 (2016).
62
David Isidore Tan, Enforcing National Court Judgments as Arbitration Awards under the New York
Convention, 34 (3) ARB. INT’L 415, 443 (2018); see generally May Lu, The New York Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards: Analysis of the Seven Defenses to Oppose
Enforcement in the Unites States and England, 23(3) ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 748, 784–85 (2006).
63
N.Y. Convention, supra note 7, at art. III–VI.
64
Id. at art. II–VI.
65
Id. at art. VII(1)–(2).
66
Id. at art. I(3).
67
RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN ARBITRAL AWARDS: THE INTERPRETATION AND
APPLICATION OF THE NEW YORK CONVENTION BY NATIONAL COURTS 2, 71 (George A. Bermann & Springer
Publisher eds., 2017).
68
Gary B. Born, supra note 76, 115-87.
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of the New York Convention enabled it to withstand the test of time and influence the lives of
billions of people all over the world.69
1.3.2 The Contribution of Strong International and Regional Arbitration Institutions
One of the main reasons for the dominance of ICA in transnational dispute
resolution is the presence of strong international and regional arbitration institutions that have
an irreplaceable role in the development and harmonization of ICA law and practice. By
providing established uniform rules, these institutions aim to maximize the effectiveness of
the arbitral process, whilst minimizing judicial intervention, other than when it is needed to
support arbitration agreements and awards.70 In addition, the availability of such arbitral
bodies has boosted competition in specialized arbitration and empowered the parties to select
one that is best suited to their needs. Institutional arbitration offers substantial advantages in
terms of permanent existence, experience, quality control, modern institutional and procedural
rules, specialized staff, and reasonable charges.71
For the purpose at hand, it suffices to enumerate four of the major International and
Regional Arbitral Institutions that are playing a major role in the harmonization of ICA law
and practice. These are:
The International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) International Court of
Arbitration72,
The American Arbitration Association (AAA) International Center for
Dispute Resolution73,
The London Court of International Arbitration 189274, and
Other Arbitral Institutions such as the Arbitration Institute of the
Stockholm Chamber of Commerce (SCC), the European Court of Arbitration, the German
Institute of Arbitration (DIS), the Netherlands Arbitration Institute (NAI), the Vienna
International Arbitration Centre (VIAC), the Singapore International Arbitration Centre
(SIAC), the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague (PCA), and the World Intellectual
Property Organization (WIPO) Arbitration and Mediation.75

69
V. V. Veeder, Is there a Need to Revise the New York Convention?, 1 (2) J. INT’L DISP. SETTLEMENT 499,
506 (2010).
70
MOSES, supra note 17, at 10–12.
71
Redfern et al., supra note 8, at 45-50.
72
Craig et al., International Chamber of Commerce Arbitration (3rd eds. 2000); Derains and Schwarz, A Guide
to the New ICC Rules of Arbitration, Kluwer L. Int’l (2d ed. 2005); Jason Fry et al., The Secretariat’s Guide to
ICC Arbitration (ICC 2012).
73
Winston Stromberg, Avoiding the Full Court Press: International Commercial Arbitration and other Global
Alternative Dispute Resolution Processes, LOYOLA LOS ANGELES L. REV. 1337, 1351 (2007).
74
Wade & Clauchy, Commentary on the LCIA Arbitration Rules (Sweet & Maxwell 2015); LCIA Rules Art.
XXII (1)(d), (e); LCIA Rules Art. XV (2); LCIA Rules Art. I-II, IV, V (5), XIV, XXVII (1) & CCLXXXVIII
(2014).
75
MOSES, supra note 17, at 22; Pete Turner & Reza Mohtashami, A Guide to the LCIA Arbitration Rules 25
(Oxford Univ. Press 2d ed. 2009).
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1.4 The Dominant Success of ICA is Evident from Existing Empirical Research
With the rise of the global economy, private dispute resolution processes in general
and ICA, in particular, have quickly become a vital component of international business
relationships.76
Studies made on the attitude of corporations towards international dispute settlement
mechanisms reveal an overwhelming preference for ICA over litigation in national courts and
arbitration is found to be the first-choice method of binding dispute resolution.77 A standardsetting study made in 2016 also reveals that arbitration has been the primary means of
resolving cross-border commercial disputes for decades after World War II and up to 90% of
all international commercial contracts include an arbitration provision.78 Similarly, a
groundbreaking study in 2004 found that 90 percent of respondents preferred arbitration to
cross-border litigation.79 Moreover, the revised version of the same study in 2006 showed a
73 % preference for ICA.80
It is also evident from the 2018 comprehensive International Arbitration Survey that
97% of respondents (who are practitioners, arbitrators, counsels, and experts) indicate that
ICA is their preferred method of dispute resolution, either on a stand-alone basis (of 48%) or
in conjunction with ADR (of 49%).81
In addition, it is evident from the results of an International Arbitration Survey
conducted in 2015 that 90% of the respondents indicated international arbitration as their
preferred dispute resolution mechanism either as a stand-alone mechanism (56%) or together
with ADR (34%).82
Moreover, although due to its confidential and institutional nature, empirical studies
and data are mostly unpublished and infrequent concerning ICA, over the years, many
scholars have undertaken eye-opening empirical studies revealing the dominant use of ICA as
a preferred mechanism of transnational commercial dispute resolution compared to litigation
and mediation.83
76

Julie Barker, International Mediation—A Better Alternative for the Resolution of Commercial Disputes:
Guidelines for a U.S. Negotiator involved in an International Commercial Mediation with Mexicans, 19
LOYOLA L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 1, 3-4 (1996).
77
Susan D. Franck, The Role of International Arbitrators, 12 ILSA J. OF INT’L & COMP. LAW 499 (2006).
78
S.I. Strong, Realizing Rationality: An Empirical Assessment of International Commerical Mediation, 73
WASHINGTON & LEE L. REV. 1973, 2085 (2016).
79
Loukas Mistelis, International Arbitration—Corporate Attitudes and Practices? Twelve Perceptions Tested
Myths Data and Analysis Research Report, 15 THE AM. REV. OF INT’L ARB. 525, 559 (2004).
80
Loukas Mistelis & Gerry Lagerberg, International arbitration: Corporate Attitudes and Practices 2006,
QUEEN MARY UNIV. OF LONDON SCH. OF INT’L ARBITRATION (2006).
81
Queen Mary University of London School of International Arbitration, International Arbitration Survey: The
Evolution of International Arbitration, White & Case 2 (2018) (An overwhelming 99% of the respondents
stated that they would recommend ICA to resolve cross-border disputes in the future. By comparison, these
surveys showed, both in 2015 and 2018, that only 4% of respondents expressed that they would rather opt for
commercial litigation to resolve a cross-border dispute.).
82
Queen Mary University of London School of International Arbitration, 2015 International Arbitration
Survey: Improvements and Innovations in International Arbitration, White & Case 2-6 (2015) (Including
similar results from 2006, 2008, 2010, and 2013 surveys as well).
83
Christopher Drahozal, Of Rabbits and Rhinoceri: A Survey of Empirical Research on International
Commercial Arbitration, 20 Jour. of Int’l Arbitration 23, 30 (2003); Richard W. Naimark & Stephanie E. Keer,
International Private Commercial Arbitration: Expectations and Perceptions of Attorneys and Business
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2. THE ROLE OF THE INSTRUMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL
LITIGATION IN THE HARMONIZATION OF THE RULES OF TRANSNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION
The following sections discuss the roles of the two typical international legal
instruments of transnational litigation, which are the Hague Convention on Choice of Court
Agreement of 2005 (hereinafter ‘COCA’) and the Hague Judgment Convention of 2019, in
the harmonization of the rules of transnational commercial dispute resolution.
2.1 The COCA 2005
2.1.1 The Role of the COCA in the Harmonization of the Rules of Transnational
Commercial Dispute Resolution
The COCA was adopted on June 30, 2005.84 The COCA entered into force in 2015
between the EU and Mexico. By 2021, 4 other countries ratified it including Denmark,
Singapore, Montenegro, and the UK.85
The COCA is designed to create a mandatory international legal regime for the
enforcement of exclusive jurisdiction agreements and the recognition and enforcement of
judgments resulting from proceedings based on such agreements.86 The COCA has the
objective to create an internationally uniform legal framework to promote transnational trade
by encouraging judicial cooperation via the recognition and enforcement of judgments
concerning the choice of court agreements.87 By so doing, the COCA has the objectives of
facilitating parties’ autonomy in forum selection, cross border movement of judgments,
enhancing certainty and predictability to litigants, and harmonizing the rules of choice of
court agreements in member states.88
The COCA is well equipped with the following rules (tools) to achieve its specific
and commercial objectives as an instrument of transnational dispute resolution that influences
the harmonization of the law and practice of transnational commercial litigation:

People, 30 INT’L BUS. L. REV. 203, 341 (2002); C.R. Drahozal & R.W. Naimark, supra note 4, 341; Christian
Bohring-Uhle, Arbitration and Mediation in International Business, Kluwer L. Int’l 129, 134 (1996); Wang
Sheng Chang, Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards in the People’s Republic on China, Improving the
Efficiency of Arbitration Agreements and Awards: 40 years of Application of the New York Convention,
Kluwer L. Int’l 461, 483 (1999); Andrew Myburgh & Jordi Paniagua, Does International Commercial
Arbitration Promote Foreign Direct Investment?, 59 J. L. & ECON. 597, 627 (2016).
84
Trevor Hartley & Masato Dogauchi, Hague Conference on Private International Law, COCA (2005).
85
Hague Conference on Private International Law, The 2005 Choice of Court Convention enters into force,
HCCH, Oct. 1, 2015, https://www.hcch.net/en/news-archive/details/?varevent=428; Hague Conference on
Private International Law, Convention of 30 June, 2005 on Choice of Court Agreements, HCCH,
https://www.hcch.net/en/instruments/conventions/status-table/?cid=98, (last updated Mar. 3, 2021).
86
Ronald A. Brand, Arbitration or Litigation? Choice of Forum after the 2005 Hague Convention on Choice
of Court Agreements, UNIV. OF PITTSBURGH, Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2009-14 (2009).
87
Adrian Briggs, The Conflict of Laws 117 (Oxford Univ. Press 2d ed. 2013).
88
Johannes Landbrecht, The Hague Convention on Private International Law: Shaping a Global Framework
for Party Autonomy, 1 INT’L BUS. L. JOUR. 35, 36-40 (2017).
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1. The chosen court in an exclusive choice of court agreement shall have jurisdiction
to decide a dispute unless the agreement is invalid under the law of that state.89 Accordingly,
the designated court has no power to stay its proceedings on grounds related to forum nonconveniens or the lis alibi pendens doctrine.90 First, this provision helps local judges to
determine the competent court of jurisdiction. Second, by ascertaining the adjudication of the
dispute in the selected court, this rule provides to the disputants the required level of ex-ante
security, certainty, and predictability that the court will resolve the dispute and the parties will
not be frustrated after having selected a court.91 Third, the provision guarantees even greater
certainty by presuming that a choice-of-court agreement is exclusive unless expressly stated
as non-exclusive.92 Fourth, it also assures party autonomy and freedom to predetermine the
court of jurisdiction by signing an exclusive choice of court agreements.93 Accordingly,
because the identity of the forum is crucial in transnational litigation in determining the
substantive outcome of a case, the ability to choose the forum court allows the parties to
consider the related risk.94 Fifth, the exclusive nature of the agreement enables the parties to
exclude, by agreement, hostile jurisdictions or choose a neutral jurisdiction including a court
that has no factual connection with the dispute.95
2. Any court, in member states, other than the chosen court shall suspend or dismiss
proceedings to which an exclusive choice of court agreement applies.96 Accordingly, the
courts other than the chosen court must decline jurisdiction if it is established that there is a
valid and exclusive choice-of-court agreement in favor of the chosen court. The nominated
court shall exercise jurisdiction whilst all other courts are required to stay and eventually
decline jurisdiction unless in case of the stated exceptional grounds.97 This rule is crucial to
avoid unnecessary competition for jurisdiction, forum shopping, and parallel proceedings and
provides a certain, predictable, speedier, and cheaper method of dispute resolution to parties.
3. A judgment given by the chosen court shall be recognized and enforced in the
courts of the other Contracting States98 and recognition and enforcement of such judgment
may be refused only on the grounds specified in the COCA.99 First, by imposing the duty of
enforcement on member states, the COCA removes the element of discretion and thus a
degree of uncertainty thereby promoting the use of national courts in transnational dispute
89

The Convention on Choice of Court Agreement (“COCA”) 2005, art. 3 (a, c).
Id. art. 5 (2).
91
Matthias Weller, Choice of Court Agreements under Brussels La and Under the Hague Convention:
Coherences and Clashes, 13 J. PRIVATE INT’L L. 91, 129 (2017).
92
The COCA, supra note 89, art. 3 (b); Brooke Marshall & Mary Keyes, Australia’s Accession to the Hague
Convention of the Choice of Court Agreements, 41 MELBOURNE UNIV. L. REV. 246, 272 (2017).
93
Id. at art. 3 (a, c-d); Trevor Harley & Masato Dogauchi, supra note 84; Ronald A. Brand, supra note 86.
94
Michael Douglas, Will Australia Accede to the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements, 17
MACQUARIE L. J. 148 (2017).
95
Id.
96
The COCA, supra note 89, at art. 6.
97
Id. at art. 6(a-e).
98
Id. At art. 8; Huang Zhang, ‘International Jurisdiction under the 2005 Hague Convention on Choice of Court
Agreements: Implications for China’, 47(2) HONG KONG L. J. 555, 583 (2017).
99
Id. art. 9; RONALD A. BRAND & PAUL M. HERRUP, THE 2005 HAGUE CONVENTION ON CHOICE-OF-COURT
AGREEMENTS: COMMENTARY AND DOCUMENTS 111 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2008); Caroline Edsall,
Implementing the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements in the United States: An Opportunity to
Clarify Recognition and Enforcement Practice 120 YALE L. J. 397, 397-406 (2010).
90
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settlement.100 Second, by limiting the grounds of refusal to recognize and enforce the
judgments of the selected courts, the COCA is proved pro-enforcement and facilitates the
cross-border movement of judgments, providing a foundation for further international judicial
cooperation and harmonization of transnational litigation.101 Third, the ascertainment of
recognition and enforcement of the judgments of the designated court throughout the courts of
member states is crucial to the disputants because it avoids the further risk of re-litigation of
the same cause of action in a foreign court due to the lack of recognition and enforcement in
the first instance.102
4. Each Contracting State has the opportunity to declare that its courts will recognize
and enforce judgments given by courts of the other Contracting States designated in a nonexclusive choice of court agreement.103 This rule is significant for the harmonization of
transnational litigation for it enables states to increase the productivity of the COCA by many
folds.104 Although nonexclusive agreements would not receive the benefits in articles 5 and 6,
the resulting judgment could receive the benefits of recognition and enforcement in article
8.105 By so doing, the scope of application of the COCA can be exceptionally extended to
cover transnational disputes where the parties have signed a non-exclusive choice of court
agreements.106
5. The scope of application of the COCA is exclusively limited to international cases
in civil and commercial matters and there is a broad exclusion of subject matter.107
Accordingly, it applies only to resolve disputes of international and commercial nature where
an exclusive choice of court agreements is signed.108 The specific application of the COCA to
such disputes is a testament to its determination to contribute its part to the development of
transnational commercial dispute resolution. Moreover, it should be noted that the broad
exclusion mostly refers to non-commercial matters that are irrelevant for the purposes of the
COCA, and despite the exclusions, a large number of relevant commercial contracts still fall
within the scope of application of the COCA.109
On the other hand, the fact that the provisions of the COCA have been ratified and
incorporated into the national laws of all of its Contracting States, the provisions of the
COCA was uniformly interpreted and applied in the High Court of Singapore in 2018 to
resolve an issue in a dispute110, and the provisions of the COCA are flexible and suitable for
harmonious application with other relevant international instruments are practical testaments
100

Alex Mills, The Hague Choice of Court Convention and Cross-Border Commercial Dispute Resolution in
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103
The COCA, supra note 89, at art. 22.
104
Matthew H. Adler & Michele C. Zarychta, The Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements: The
United States Joins the Judgment Enforcement Ban 27 NORTHWESTERN J. INT’L L. BUS. 1, 35 (2006).
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that the COCA is well equipped with the needed rules (tools) to achieve its specific and
commercial objectives.111 Additionally, the COCA has passed through an extensive
deliberation procedure before adoption and after it has been adopted in 2005, the necessary
post-adoption aids and adequate endorsements were made to it by the relevant national and
international stakeholders from 2005 to 2015, which adequately indicates the quality of the
instrument.112
Moreover, if backed by wide ratification, similar to the New York Convention, the
COCA, given it has been brought into force only recently, has vast potential to alleviate the
age-old problem of the lack of enforcement of court judgments in transnational commercial
litigation.113
The COCA is designed to provide international litigants with an alternative means
of dispute resolution to arbitration.114 The COCA acts as the analog for the New York
Convention in litigation as it would afford to choice-of-court agreements and resulting foreign
judgments many of the same advantages of enforcement that arbitral agreements and awards
enjoy under the latter.115
2.1.2 The Success of the COCA as Instrument of Transnational Commercial Litigation
Although the COCA has the potential to bring in transnational litigation as an
alternative to ICA, it will not be successful to compete with the dominant position of ICA in
the short run. Accordingly, the following are the major factors that constrain the success of
the COCA in the near future:
The COCA was in force for only 7 years (compared to the 60-year-old
New York Convention),
The COCA has a very limited number of signatories116,
The COCA has not been ratified by the major trading states such as the
USA, China, and India117,
The provisions of the COCA are only applicable between the courts of the
Contracting States, which is a fact that made the future success of the COCA directly
dependent on the amount and quality of ratification that it will attract118, and

111

The COCA, supra note 89, at arts. 19-23, 26.
International Chamber of Commerce, ICC urges governments to ratify Hague choice of court convention,
https://iccwbo.org/media-wall/news-speeches/icc-urges-governments-to-ratify-hague-choice-of-court
convention/. (last visited September 11, 2021).
113
Paulsson, supra note 51, at 23-24.
114
Jens Dammann & Henry Hansmann, Globalizing Commercial Litigation, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 5 (2008).
115
Peter D. Trooboff, Proposed Principles for United States Implementation of the New Hague Convention On
Choice of Court Agreements, 42 INT’L L. & POL’Y. 237, 241 (2009).
116
Convention
of
30
June
2005
on
Choice
of
Court
Agreements,
HCCH,
https://www.hcch.net/en/instruments/conventions/status-table/?cid=98 (last visited Apr. 8, 2022). The EU,
Mexico, Singapore, Denmark, and Montenegro are currently the only parties to the convention.
117
Guy S. Lipe & Timothy J. Tyler, The Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements: Creating Room
for Choice in International Cases, 33 Houston J. Int’l L. 1, 33 (2010). China and the USA have signed on the
Convention.
118
Mukarrum Ahmed, BREXIT and English Jurisdiction Agreements: The Post-Referendum Legal Landscape,
27 EUR. BUS. L. R. 989, 994-95 (2016).
112

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository,
17

17

Journal of Dispute Resolution, Vol. 2022, Iss. 2 [], Art. 5

THE JOURNAL OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION

courts.

The provisions of the COCA are not adequately interpreted in national

Moreover, the following subsidiary factors will also constrain the immediate success
of the COCA119:
The COCA has a narrow scope of application,
The COCA imposes a wider variety of exclusions from its scope,
especially regarding intellectual property rights,
The COCA lacks provisions on civil procedure rules and for parties with
no choice of court agreements, and
The COCA does not accord protection to small and micro-enterprises.
However, it should be noted that, since the COCA has been enforced in 2015 its
story is changing as increasing numbers of states are actively considering ratification.120
Besides, as proved from the case law precedent in Singapore in 2018, the COCA is
fully in force and applicable between the courts of the Contracting States as an instrument of
transnational litigation. As a result, in the long run, as long as it is backed by wide ratification,
there is no obvious reason why the COCA would not be successful.121
2.2 The Hague Judgment Convention of 2019
2.2.1 The Role of the Judgment Convention in the Harmonization of the Rules of
Transnational Commercial Dispute Resolution
The Hague Judgments Convention (hereafter ‘the Convention’) was adopted in 2019
after 27 years of deliberation under the auspices of the Hague Conference.122 By 2021, the
Convention is signed by only Ukraine, Uruguay, Russia, Israel, and Costa Rica. However, the
Convention is yet to be ratified and brought into force.123
The Convention has the specific objective of facilitating cross-border trade by
reducing the costs and risks associated with cross-border dealings and enhancing
predictability and certainty in dispute settlement.124 Accordingly, the Convention creates a
common, binding, multilateral framework for the recognition and enforcement of foreign
judgments on civil and commercial matters among its Contracting States.125
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By helping to escape national borders and enhancing transnational circulation and
enforcement of judgments, the Convention helps litigants to enforce judgments awarded in
other countries and acquire practical relief abroad based on such judgments.126
Moreover, the Convention targets to alleviate the age-old problem of uncertainty of
getting judgments recognized and enforced abroad due to the lack of an internationally
enforceable litigation instrument.127 As a transnational litigation instrument, the Convention
also seeks to provide the same certainty for court judgments that the New York Convention
has provided for the global recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards.128
The Convention also gives a great deal of emphasis to the global enforcement of
foreign judgments, among others, by129:
Giving priority to identifying the judgments that are eligible for
recognition and enforcement,
Stipulating the process for recognition and enforcement of such judgments,
Dealing exclusively with the recognition and enforcement of final
judgments given by the forum court, and
Disregarding judgments given by courts from the Non-contracting States.
Furthermore, by providing the minimum bases of jurisdiction that make a judgment
eligible for recognition and enforcement, the Convention disregards hostile and stringent
jurisdictional rules laid out by domestic laws for the recognition and enforcement of a foreign
judgment.130 Hence, any judgment of the forum court delivered based on one of the bases of
jurisdiction laid out in article 5 of the Convention shall be recognized and enforced
throughout the courts in the Contracting States of the Convention.131 However, it should be
noted that the decision to recognize and enforce judgments that are not eligible based on the
stated grounds in the Convention is left to the discretion of the law of the domestic court,
which still broadens the chance of enforcement of foreign judgments by providing an extra
opportunity of recognition and enforcement to non-eligible judgments that could have been
rejected otherwise.132
In conclusion, from the above discussion, the Convention, by exclusively defining
the criteria for refusing recognition or enforcement, enhances legal certainty and
predictability and simplifies the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments in other
jurisdictions ultimately facilitating the global circulation of judgments and access to justice.133
On the other hand, the following additional factors indicate that the Convention is
well equipped with the needed rules (tools) to be successful in the future134:
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The Convention is characterized by exclusivity and specificity of subject
matter and scope (international and commercial),
The Convention provides the necessary flexibility to acceding states via
the possibility of declarations, and
The provisions of the Convention are open to compatible application with
other relevant Conventions.
2.2.2 The Success of the Judgment Convention as Instrument of Transnational
Commercial Litigation
Although the Convention is adequately crafted and well equipped with the needed
rules (tools) to achieve its specific and commercial objectives, the fact that the Convention is
only applicable between the courts of Contracting States has made the success of the
Convention directly dependent on the number of ratification it will attract in the future. To
date, given the fact that the Convention was adopted only 4 years ago, it is highly constrained
by lack of ratification.135
Accordingly, the following factors constrain the success of the Convention in
impacting the landscape of transnational commercial dispute settlement in the near future:
The Convention was only adopted very recently in July 2019,
The Convention has not been brought into force yet because it has not
attracted an adequate number and quality of ratification, and therefore
The provisions of the Convention have not been incorporated into national
laws of Contracting States, and
The provisions of the Convention are yet to be uniformly interpreted in
domestic courts of Contracting States to resolve issues in a dispute.
Therefore, in the absence of the attributes stated above, for the near future, the
Convention remains to be a paper-tiger and the quest to utilize the Convention as an
alternative transnational litigation instrument to arbitration remains unfulfilled.
3. THE ROLE OF THE INSTRUMENTS OF TRANSNATIONAL COMMERCIAL
MEDIATION IN THE HARMONIZATION OF THE RULES OF TRANSNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION
The following section discusses the role of the United Nations Convention on
International Settlement Agreements Resulting from Mediation, also known as, the Singapore
Convention on Mediation of 2018 (hereafter ‘the Convention’) as an instrument of
transnational mediation in the harmonization of the rules of transnational commercial dispute
resolution.
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3.1 The Singapore Convention on Mediation 2018
3.1.1 The Role of the Singapore Convention on Mediation in the Harmonization of the
Rules of Transnational Commercial Dispute Resolution
The Convention was adopted in 2018.136 The Convention came into force on 12
September 2020.137 By 2021, the Convention is ratified by only 9 countries namely Belarus,
Ecuador, Fiji, Georgia, Honduras, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, and Turkey, and signed by
55 countries.138
The Convention provides a uniform and efficient international framework for the
cost-effective and prompt recognition and enforcement of mediated settlement agreements to
resolve transnational commercial disputes amenable to States with different legal, social, and
economic systems.139 By so doing, the Convention aims to render mediation more efficient
and attractive to commercial disputants globally, as an alternative to international
arbitration and litigation.140
Similarly, by avoiding the uncertainties in the enforcement of mediated agreements,
reducing the instances where a dispute leads to the termination of a commercial relationship,
facilitating the administration of international transactions by commercial parties, and
producing savings in the administration of justice by States, the Convention has great
potential to bolster the use of mediation as a method for resolving cross-border commercial
disputes and thereby avoiding the risk of re-litigation in case one of the parties fails to
comply.141
The lack of a transnational instrument for giving legal effect to mediated settlement
agreements has been a significant barrier to the willingness of international commercial
disputants to use mediation.142 Accordingly, the Convention, as a gap-filling transnational
mediation instrument, is destined to alleviate this long-standing problem of transnational
mediation by giving mediation the same type of boost that arbitration received from the New
York Convention.143
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The Convention applies to settlement agreements that are mediated, international,
and commercial, and not subjected to a specific exclusion.144 Accordingly, the delimitation of
the scope to international commercial matters is a testament to its dedication to providing
mediation as an alternative means of transnational commercial dispute resolution.145
Moreover, the Convention does not apply to settlement agreements: that have been
approved by a court or concluded in the course of proceedings before a court or that are
enforceable as a judgment in the State of that court, and settlement agreements that have been
recorded and are enforceable as an arbitral award.146 This rule, by avoiding possible overlap
in subject matter and scope with existing and future relevant international legal instruments or
Conventions, boosts both the compatible application of the Convention with other relevant
instruments and the use of mediation as an alternative to arbitration and litigation.147
Similarly, the rule, by encouraging disputants to resort to alternative mechanisms of dispute
settlement such as arbitration or litigation, has proven that the Convention is a proharmonization instrument, which gives priority to the efficient resolution of transnational
commercial disputes by using the most suited method of dispute resolution.148
The other beneficial attribute of the Convention is the fact that it does not require
the disputants to choose a local seat for their mediation (delocalization of forum) so long as
they have concluded a written agreement resulting from a mediation to resolve their
commercial dispute. This rule by ascertaining neutrality of the forum and avoiding
unnecessary procedures related to the forum court guarantees a speedier and cheaper dispute
resolution.149 Furthermore, the Convention guarantees more flexible enforcement of valid
mediated settlement agreements by forcing the contracting States to enforce such agreements
as per their domestic rules of procedure and in line with the requirements of the
Convention.150
On the other hand, the Convention is also committed to guaranteeing the global
enforcement of valid mediated settlement agreements by exhaustively enumerating the
grounds for the Contracting States to deny recognition and enforcement.151 Accordingly, it is
only based on the following grounds that the Contracting States are allowed to refuse to
enforce valid mediated settlement agreements152:
If a party to the settlement agreement was under some incapacity;
If the settlement agreement sought to be relied upon is null and void,
inoperative or incapable of being performed or is not binding, or is not final, according to its
terms, or has been subsequently modified;
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If the obligations in the settlement agreement have been performed, or are
not clear or comprehensible, or granting relief would be contrary to the terms of the
settlement agreement;
If there was a serious breach by the mediator of standards applicable to the
mediator or the mediation;
If there was a failure by the mediator to disclose to the parties
circumstances that raise justifiable doubts as to the mediator’s impartiality or independence;
and if granting relief would be contrary to the public policy of that Contracting State or the
subject matter of the dispute is not capable of settlement by mediation under the law of that
Contracting State.
The other fascinating quality of the Convention is the fact that it provides the
necessary degree of flexibility to ratifying States by guarantying their right to make or
withdraw, at any time, only two types of reservations, which are destined to restrict the scope
of application of the Convention.153 Accordingly, the Contracting States to the Convention
may either declare that the Convention shall not apply to settlement agreements to which it is
a party, or to which any governmental agencies or any person acting on behalf of a
governmental agency is a party, to the extent specified in the declaration, or declare that the
Convention shall apply only to the extent that the parties to the settlement agreement have
agreed to the application of the Convention.154 This attribute of the Convention is practically
proved beneficial, as it is quite evident from the ratification history of some of the
Contracting States such as Belarus, Georgia, and Saudi Arabia.155 Similarly, as evident from
its recent ratification history, the inclusion of the rules concerning the right to declare
reservations in the Convention was one of the reasons for the successful adoption and
enforcement of the Convention in a relatively short record time.156
On the other hand, the Convention is also committed to ascertaining the harmonious
application of its provisions with other relevant Conventions by guaranteeing the rights of any
interested party to exercise any right it may have to avail itself of a settlement agreement in
the manner and to the extent allowed by the law or the treaties of the Contracting States of the
Convention where such settlement agreement is sought to be relied upon.157
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3.1.2 The Success of the Singapore Convention as Instrument of Transnational
Commercial Mediation
All of the aforementioned characteristics demonstrate that the Convention is wellequipped with the necessary rules (tools) to achieve its specific and commercial goals.158 It
seems after having recognized these beneficial features of the Convention that an increasing
number of countries have signed or ratified the Convention and brought it into force within a
relatively shorter period since its adoption in 2018. However, whether the Convention will be
successful in the future depends on the amount and quality of ratification that it will attract
and the underway of an effective scheme of awareness creation to that effect. On contrary, in
the absence of adequate ratification, the Convention remains to be unsuccessful to play its
part in bringing mediation as an alternative mechanism of transnational commercial dispute
resolution.159
Currently, the following factors constrain the Convention from achieving similar
success to the New York Convention:
The Convention has been adopted only two years ago,
The Convention has been ratified by only 9 countries and yet it has not
been ratified by the major commercial nations such as the USA, China, India, and the EU,
The provisions of the Convention have not been adequately incorporated
into national laws, and
The provisions of the Convention are yet to be applied in a court of law to
resolve an issue in a dispute.160
However, as is, this does not rule out the possibility of the Convention playing a role
in dispute resolution. As a result, disputants, coming from the Contacting States, in a
transnational commercial dispute can still use it as an alternative to arbitration or litigation to
resolve their problems.161
CONCLUSION
When compared to litigation and mediation, ICA was and will continue to be the
realistic means of transnational commercial dispute resolution. Various factors contributed to
the relative success of ICA.
158
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On the one hand, the distinctive advantageous features of ICA such as party
autonomy, confidentiality, finality, recognition and enforcement, delocalization, neutrality,
and flexibility made it more suitable to resolve transnational disputes. On the other hand, the
availability of strong international legal and institutional frameworks for ICA is the other
major factor that contributed to its success.
However, the predominant use and success of ICA were not acquired instantly. It is
rather the outcome of many years of concerted efforts of various international law-making
bodies such as the UNCITRAL and many arbitral institutions to find an efficient transnational
solution to international commercial problems.
Moreover, the most invaluable attribute of ICA that contributed to its success is the
fact that the agreement to arbitrate and arbitral awards are recognized and enforced globally.
The global enforcement of arbitral awards is the outcome of the success of the New York
Convention 1958 in attracting a substantial amount and quality of ratification in 163 countries
in the world. This ended the long-standing problem of the lack of recognition and
enforcement of foreign awards in transnational dispute resolution and accorded to disputants
an ex-ante certainty and predictability in the resolution of their commercial disputes.
On the other hand, ICA is not the only means of transnational commercial dispute
resolution. It is not even the default mechanism of dispute resolution for that matter. ICA
became dominant not because it is perfect but also because of the lack of other realistic means
of transnational dispute resolution. Recently, however, mainly due to the adoption of various
international instruments of dispute resolution on litigation and mediation, the latter methods
are being considered viable alternatives to ICA in the area of transnational commercial
dispute resolution.
Except for the difference in their basic nature or subject matter, all the newly
adopted relevant Conventions, discussed in this study, are crafted as an analog to and to
achieve the success of the New York Convention of 1958. Therefore, the Conventions have
stark similarities with the latter in terms of their intended specific and commercial objectives,
the tools that they use to achieve such objectives, and their main objective of alleviating the
long-standing problem of lack of global enforcement of foreign judgments and mediated
settlement agreements.
Accordingly, the COCA of 2005, the Judgments Convention of 2019, and the
Singapore Convention of 2018 are inspired by the New York Convention in defining their
scope of application (international and commercial), their specific and exclusive nature, their
flexible and compatible nature, the priority they give to recognition and enforcement, the
limited grounds stipulated for refusal to recognize and enforce, the fact that their application
is limited between member states and so on. These aforementioned attributes of the
Conventions are testaments to their devotion to providing viable mechanisms of transnational
dispute resolution in the form of litigation and mediation as an alternative to ICA.
However, unlike the New York Convention, the aforementioned Conventions will
not result in a dramatic change in the current landscape of commercial dispute resolution.
Thus, ICA will remain to be the dominant method in that regard. This is because, unlike the
New York Convention, (1) these Conventions are only recently adopted and enforced, (2) the
application of the Conventions is delimited between member states and their success depends
on the amount of ratification that they will attract, (3) the Conventions are not adequately
ratified and enforced in terms of number and quality of ratification, (4) The provisions of the
Conventions are not adequately incorporated into domestic laws, and (5) The provisions of
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the Conventions are not adequately and uniformly interpreted in courts to resolve issues in a
dispute.
Therefore, it is quite evident from the above points that, currently, despite their
adoption and enforcement, the Conventions have little or no practical role in transnational
commercial dispute resolution. Hence, the Conventions are currently unsuccessful to achieve
their specific and commercial objectives in providing transnational litigation and mediation as
an alternative to ICA. Finally, however, if the Conventions have the necessary support from
the relevant international law-making bodies, and if they are ratified by a larger number of
countries, there is no reason why they will not be effective in offering a more diverse and
viable alternative to ICA in the future.
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